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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: Municipal Inspectors Must
Obtain Search Warrants When Refused
Entry to Private Premises
Defendant refused entry to a city housing inspector conduct-
ing a routine inspection,' and was arrested for violating the San
Francisco Housing Code.2 At trial, defendant contended that
the section of the Housing Code authorizing entry without a
search warrant violated his right of privacy under the fourth and
fourteenth amendments. This contention was rejected by both
the trial court and the court of appeal.3 The Supreme Court of
California refused to hear the case. On appeal, the United States
Supreme Court reversed, holding that where consent to an
administrative search is refused, the inspector must obtain a
search warrant, and municipal code provisions authorizing entry
without a warrant are unconstitutional under the fourth amend-
ment. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).4
The question of the constitutionality of locally authorized
administrative searches has rarely been faced. The issue was
first raised in District of Columbia v. Little,5 where the court
held that the privacy of the home could not be invaded by admin-
istrative officials except on the authority of a search warrant."
The court stated that no valid constitutional ground for distin-
guishing between health inspections and police searches for crim-
inal evidence existed, and that the privacy of the home must
1. SAN FRANcIsco, CAL., CODE § 86(3) provides for annual in-
spections of apartment houses for the purpose of issuing occupancy per-
mits. Defendant's residency in the rear of his store was inconsistent
with the building's occupancy permit. The inspector was refused ad-
mittance on three occasions, even after defendant was informed of the
inspector's legal right to enter under the City Housing Code. SAN
FRANCISO, CAL., CODE § 503.
2. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., CODE § 507 makes it a misdemeanor to
oppose the execution of any provision of the municipal code.
3. 237 Cal. App. 2d 128, 46 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1965).
4. In a companion case, a Seattle ordinance authorizing inspec-
tions and free entry by the fire chief was challenged by the owner of a
Seattle warehouse who had been prosecuted for refusing entry to a fire
inspector. The Supreme Court stated that the warrant requirements of
Camara apply to business as well as residential premises. See v. City
of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967).
5. 178 F.2d 13 (D.C. Cir. 1949), affd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 1
(1950).
6. Until Camara, Little stood alone in requiring warrants for ad-
ministrative inspections.
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be protected in both cases.7 However, in Givner v. Maryland,
the Maryland court rejected the Little view and held that admin-
istrative entry without a search warrant for routine inspection
during daylight hours was reasonable and not violative of the
fourth amendment.9 In reaching this conclusion, it placed con-
siderable emphasis on the public interest in the code programs
and in the routine nature of the inspections. 10
In Frank v. Maryland," the Supreme Court upheld the same
code provision sustained in Givner. However, the Givner rea-
soning that health inspection programs are of such importance
that they cannot be hampered by the requirement of a warrant
was not the primary basis for the Frank decision. Instead, the
majority relied on the historical basis of the search and seizure
amendment to conclude that the constitutional protection was not
applicable to reasonable searches for noncriminal purposes.
12
The code enforcement inspection was considered civil in nature
and therefore outside the area of protection afforded by the
fourth amendment. Justice Douglas, dissenting,' 3 suggested that
the majority had misread history in refusing to extend the fourth
amendment protection to civil searches.' 4 Applying a more in-
clusive interpretation of the protection of privacy, he considered
administrative inspections equally as violative of the fourth
amendment as criminal searches. 15
7. 178 F.2d at 16. The court felt the prohibition against searches
was based on the common law right of a man to privacy in his own
home. Id. at 17.
8. 210 Md. 484, 124 A.2d 764 (1956).
9. Givner involved a Baltimore code provision which authorized
entry by a health inspector. See BALTnWORE, MD., CoDE art. 12, § 120
(1950).
10. 210 Md. at 504-05, 124 A.2d at 775.
11. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
12. Justice Frankfurter, writing for the majority, felt that health
inspections "touch at most upon the periphery of the important inter-
ests safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment's protection against offi-
cial intrusion." 359 U.S. at 367.
13. The Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Black, and Mr. Justice Brennan
concurred with Mr. Justice Douglas in dissenting. 359 U.S. 360, 374.
14. 359 U.S. at 374. For a good discussion of the Frank civil-
criminal distinction, see Comment, State Health Inspections and "Unrea-
sonable Search": The Frank Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 MINN. L.
REv. 513 (1960).
15. The sharp division in the Court over the issue of administrative
inspections was again evident in Ohio ex tel. Eaton v. Price, 364
U.S. 263 (1960), wherein a conviction for refusal to allow a housing
inspection was upheld by an equally divided Court, Justice Stewart
having disqualified himself from the case because his father was sitting
upon the Ohio Supreme Court which had previously upheld the con-
viction. The four dissenting justices re-echoed the Frank dissent by
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Although a few state courts continued to apply the Frank
reasoning, 6 it was clear from the deep division in the Court over
the scope of the fourth amendment that the law concerning
administrative inspections was still unsettled. In the period
between Frank and Camara, the make-up of the Supreme Court
changed' 7-a factor to which many of the developments in the
search and seizure area' s have been attributed.19 In view of the
change in personnel of the Court and the precarious majority
of Frank, a challenge of that case was almost inevitable. Such a
challenge came in Camara.
The Camara majority20 rejected the Frank conclusion that
the invasion of privacy by an administrative official is not within
Justice Douglas. 360 U.S. at 263. The four affirming justices had
previously stated, in noting probable jurisdiction, that Frank was com-
pletely controlling. 360 U.S. 248 (1959).
16. Commonwealth v. Hadley, 222 N.E.2d 681 (Mass. 1966), vacated,
388 U.S. 464 (1967); St. Louis v. Evans, 337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960). See
also DePass v. City of Spartanburg, 234 S.C. 198, 107 S.E.2d 350 (1959).
17. One year after Eaton, Justice Goldberg replaced Justice Frank-
furter, one of the leading self-restraint advocates, and aligned himself
with those favoring a broader incorporation of the fourth amendment
into fourteenth amendment due process giving them the majority posi-
tion. See, e.g., Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). The appointment of Justice Fortas
has not affected the strength of the "activist" block since he appears
to be following the path of his predecessor.
18. For thorough discussions of search and seizure law, see gen-
erally R. DAVIS, FEDERAL SEARCHEs AND SEIzuREs (1964); P. GAY & R.
PRum, THE POmcEmAN AND THE AccusED (1965) & (Supp. 1967);
J. LANDYNSKI, SEARcH AND SEIZuRE AND THE SUPREME COURT (1966);
W. RINGEL, LAWYER'S GUIDE TO LEGAL AND ILLEGAL SEARcHEs (1965).
For a history of the constitutional development of the fourth amend-
ment, see N. LAssoN, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF Tim FOURTH
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1937).
19. See generally Canan, Crime and the Supreme Court, 38 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 9, 141, 283, 370, 448, 534 (1966); Guhring, Criminal Law in the
Supreme Court of the United States, 51 WOMEN L.J. 77 (1965); Mason,
Judicial Restraint and Judicial Duty: An Historical Dichotomy, 38
N.Y. ST. B.J. 216 (1966).
20. The majority of six included Justice White, who wrote the
opinion. Justice White, who replaced Justice Whittaker in 1961, has
generally sided with the self-restraint group in the Supreme Court,
see, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), and has often
spoken vehemently against the broad incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into fourteenth amendment due process. See, e.g., Messiah v.
United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Escobedo
v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 495 (1964) (dissenting opinion); Malloy v.
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 33 (1964) (dissenting opinion); see also Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Although no clear reason for Justice
White's alignment with the majority is evident, he must have felt that
Frank v. Maryland's limited interpretation of the fourth amendment
allowed too great an invasion of privacy.
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the protection afforded by the fourth amendment 2' and applied
the more liberal interpretation tha; had been adopted by the
Little court and the Frank dissent. Since the amendment makes
no distinction between civil and criminal searches, the Court
was unwilling to do so. 22 The amendment was designed to pro-
tect the individual's right of privacy by placing the determination
of when that right may reasonably be violated in the hands of a
neutral magistrate rather than with the government official who
demands admission,2 3 irrespective of the nature of the search.
In rejecting the Frank civil-criminal distinction, the Court con-
cluded that any search of private premises is presumptively un-
reasonable if conducted without a search warrant.24
The Court considered and rejected the argument that the
public interest justified inspections without a warrant. It de-
clared that the requirement of warrants for fire, health, and
housing inspectors would not so frustrate the goals of these in-
spections as to render them unattainable. In any event, it thought
the additional burden justified by the importance of the individ-
ual rights involved. 25 However, the Court reduced the burden
of obtaining an inspection warrant by establishing a less strin-
gent probable cause test for the issuance of such warrants.20
Since a code inspection program is more effectively enforced
through periodic inspections of a general area rather than of
the individual premises,27 the Court concluded that a consider-
21. 387 U.S. at 528-31.
22. The majority argued that even under a civil search an occu-
pant may be subjected to criminal prosecution for his noncompliance
with the municipal code, thereby raising a self-protection interest.
387 U.S. 523, 531 (1967). See F. GRAD, PUBLIC HEALTH LAw MANUAL
76 (1965) (health inspections considered to be "species of searches"
and to have an effect similar to the criminally oriented searches); Frank
v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 375 (1959) (dissenting opinion); see also
F. GRAD, supra at 138-56; 13 OLA. L. REV. 318, 321-22 (1960); 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 265, 273-74 (1959).
23. 387 U.S. at 532-33; accord, Sclmerber v. California, 384 U.S.
757, 770 (1966); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-12 (1964); Johnson
v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1947); see 45 IowA L. REV. 419,
425-26 (1960).
24. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967).
25. 387 U.S. at 533.
26. Id. at 534-39. Generally, wheLher a search is reasonable or
not is determined from the facts and circumstances of each case. United
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950); Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 150 (1947); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S.
344, 357 (1931).
27. The Court pointed out that experience has shown area inspec-
tions to be the most effective way of enforcing the municipal codes.
See authorities cited in 387 U.S. at 536 n.12. Without such area inspec-
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ably broader search than that allowed in the criminal area is
reasonable.2 The reasonableness of an area inspection for code
enforcement is, according to the Court, buttressed by the historic
public acceptance of such programs, the beneficial results ob-
tained thereby, and the "relatively limited invasion of the urban
citizen's privacy"29 involved.
Therefore, the Court formulated a probable cause test which
it believed would result in "suitably restricted search war-
rant [s] ,"30 adapted to the demands of the fourth amendment and
to the needs of the administrative inspection programs.31 Thus,
the inspector requesting a warrant is not required to present spe-
cific facts or affidavits alleging a particular place, time, or spe-
cific violation.32 Instead, the magistrate's decision to authorize
an inspection warrant may be based upon the "passage of time,
the nature of the building . . . or the condition of the entire
area. '33 Probable cause will be satisfied by a general description
tions, the code enforcement program's effectiveness would be greatly
limited. For example, a New York inspection team carefully cited
12,445 actual code violations in a fifteen square block area where 567
violations had been reported by complaint. Note, Housing and Health
Inspections: A Survey and Suggestions in Light of Recent Case Law,
28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 421, 431 n.70 (1960).
28. Probable cause exists when "the facts and circumstances within
their [the officers'] knowledge of which they had reasonably trust-
worthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense was committed. Carroll
v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925); accord, United States v.
Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107-09 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108,
112 (1964); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
It is clear that the nonapplicability of this test to the administra-
tive search area is the most desirable view. To require the warrant
applicants to describe with particularity each premises to be inspected
would place an impossible burden on the administrative departments
and ultimately defeat the public interest involved. See Note, Adminis-
trative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment-A Rationale, 65 COLUM.
L. REv. 288 (1965).
29. 387 U.S. at 537.
30. Id. at 539.
31. The varying of the probable cause standard was first suggested
by Justice Douglas in the Frank case, 359 U.S. 360, 383 (1959) (dissent-
ing opinion), but was rejected by the Frank majority which felt that
the rigorous constitutional restrictions for issuing warrants could not be
relaxed. Id. at 373.
32. The fourth amendment traditionally requires that a warrant
particularly describe the place to be searched. Much litigation has
arisen in criminal cases concerning overly broad warrants. See, e.g.,
Keiningham v. United States, 287 F.2d 126 (D.C. Cir. 1960); United
States v. Poppitt, 227 F. Supp. 73 (D. Del. 1964); United States v.
Brown, 151 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Va. 1957); United States v. Diange,
32 F. Supp. 994 (W.D. Pa. 1940).
33. 387 U.S. at 538.
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of an area or the inspector's statement that the area is due for a
routine, periodic inspection. 34 The applicant need present to the
magistrate only a reasonable inspection plan fostering the goals
of the code program involved and a warrant authorizing entry
into numerous private homes will be issued.35
The Court expressed three practical considerations which
tend to reduce the burden imposed by the new warrant system.
First, municipal statistics 6 indicate that private citizens gener-
ally admit the administrative inspectors to their homes. 37 Thus
the actual breadth of the inspection programs should not be
greatly hampered, although the Camara decision may increase
the number of refusals as people become aware of the right to re-
fuse entry.8 Second, the inspection warrants will usually be
34. A warrant of this type exemplifies the long condemned "gen-
eral" or "blanket" warrants in the criminal area. See, e.g., Stanford
v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927); Aldridge v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 298, 115 P.2d 275 (1941);
Crossland v. State, 266 P.2d 649 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1954). The
primary criticism is that warrants which permit general exploratory
searches for evidence infringe upon the right of the individual in
many areas beyond those for which sufficient probable cause has been
shown for suspecting the presence of criminal evidence.
35. Apparently the warrants may be issued for a single premises
when a landowner has specifically requested the production of a war-
rant for the inspection of his particular home or business, or as area
warrants authorizing entry into every premises within a designated area.
See 387 U.S. at 555 (dissenting opinion).
36. In Dayton, Ohio, from 1955 through 1964 only 8 cases of re-
fused entry were reported in over 12,000 inspections. 65 CoLum. L.
REv. 288, 295 n.37 (1965). Under the Baltimore ordinance tested in
Frank v. Maryland, out of an average 30,000 inspections per year, the
number of prosecutions for refused entry averaged about one per year.
359 U.S. 360, 384 (1959) (dissenting opinion). In recent interviews,
Minneapolis and St. Paul fire, building, and health inspection authori-
ties estimated refusals at "very few," "none in 19 years," or "6 or 8
last year," stating that most citizens appear very cooperative to the
programs. Interviews with Clarence Bechtel, Supervisor, Housing In-
spection, in Minneapolis, Minn., and William Timm, Supervisor, Housing
Code Division, in St. Paul, Minn., Sept. 12, 1967. But see Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 541, 552 (1967) (dissenting opinion) (it is
reported that the city of Portland recorded 2,540 refusals out of 16,171
calls).
37. 387 U.S. at 539; see Note, Urban Renewals: Problems of Elimi-
nating and Preventing Urban Deterioration, 72 HARv. L. RE. 504, 547
(1959) (it is suggested that many tenants actually welcome inspections
as a step towards improving living conditions).
38. See 387 U.S. 541, 553 (1967) (dissenting opinion); Comment,
State Health Inspections and "Unreasonable Search": The Frank
Exclusion of Civil Searches, 44 Mau. L. :'REv. 513, 531 n.66 (1960). How-
ever, during the nearly three months from the Camara decision until
Sept. 12, 1967, neither the Minneapolis nor the St. Paul Health Inspec-
tion Departments had reason to obtain a search warrant based on a
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sought only after entry is refused.3 9 Inspection programs should
continue in the existing policy of seeking admittance through per-
suasion or repeated requests40 in order to avoid the time consum-
ing procedural steps needed to obtain the warrant. A search war-
rant should be only a last resort. Finally, the Camara decision
will not require extensive changes in local codes. Obviously,
where state statute previously required the obtaining of search
warrants, no change will be necessary.41 In the majority of cases,
however, codes will have to be revised and new inspection pro-
cedures followed,42 but these changes should not disrupt the pres-
ent programs to any significant degree.
Despite these justifications it is unfortunate that the Court
discerned no reasonable alternative, since the weakened stand-
ards of probable cause may produce "synthetic search war-
rant[s]. 143 A possible result may be the amalgamation of the
standards 44 which could cause a weakening of the criminal safe-
guards. However, such a result need not follow if each magis-
trate clearly differentiates the requirements and distinguishable
functions of the two types of warrant. One is intended to expose
criminal evidence while the other seeks compliance with munici-
pal codes for the betterment of the community.
The question remains, however, whether a clear differentia-
tion will be possible in every case. Between the extremes of the
criminal search for evidence and the administrative inspection
there remains a great variety of searches and inspections affect-
refusal of entry. Interviews, supra note 36. So for the present this
appears to be no problem.
39. 387 U.S. at 539-40. England has long proceeded under this
type of system, where a warrant need be obtained only if the house-
holder does not consent to the inspection. See Public Health Act,
26 Geo. 5 & 1 Edw. 8, c. 49, § 287(1) (2) (1936); see also Waters,
Rights of Entry in Administrative Officers, 27 U. CHr L. REV. 79, 84
(1959).
40. If a St. Paul inspector is barred admittance, a polite letter from
the department explaining the purpose of the program and setting up a
time for a second inspection is sent to the homeowner. In most cases,
the inspection is completed on the second visit. Minneapolis reported
similar results upon a return visit. Interviews, supra note 36.
41. E.g., N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 147.3 (1964); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 146.14(3) (1957).
42. For review of such code programs, see Note, Enforcement of
Municipal Housing Codes, 78 HAv. L. REv. 801 (1965); Note, Housing
and Health Inspection: A Survey and Suggestions in Light of Recent
Case Law, 28 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 447-53 (1960).
43. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373 (1959); see also Justice
Clark, dissenting, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 541, 546
(1967) ('"aper Warrants").
44. See 108 U. PA. L. Rrv. 265, 277 (1959).
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